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Memories and Reflections
on the Dieppe Raid of
19 August 1942
John S. Edmondson and R. Douglas Edmondson

Editor’s Note: John S. Edmondson was born in Estevan, Saskatchewan in 1919. He joined the
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry in 1938, and then served with the South Saskatchewan
Regiment during the Second World War in the Defence of England, on the Dieppe Raid and in the
Normandy Campaign until wounded during the capture of Falaise. After the war, he was
transferred to the Black Watch (RHR) Regiment of Canada. He served in Canada in many roles,
and as an exchange officer with the British 4th Division in West Germany as part of NATO. In
addition, he served with the UN Military Observer Group in Kashmir, India and Pakistan. He
served until reaching the mandatory retirement age in 1971. John, with the assistance of his son
Doug, wrote this account of his experiences at Pourville in 1993, revising it in 2003.

Move to the Isle of Wight and
Training for the Raid

I

n May 1942, our Regiment (about
840 men) was moved from the English
mainland to East Cowes on the Isle of Wight for
Combined Operations training behind a
complete security curtain. It was a welcome
change from the routine of training and our role
in the defence of England. There were route
marches for conditioning, speed marches in full
battle gear, obstacle crossing exercises, the firing
of every kind of weapon from the hip at rapid
rate of fire at short range, and training to
disembark from assault landing craft in nine
seconds. The training was hard, and we were
driven almost continually. Later, 523 men from
our battalion were chosen to actually carry out
our role in the Raid.
During this time, we were billeted on the
grounds of Norris Castle, just outside East
Cowes. Most of the men were in tents except for
a few officers who had quarters in the castle
itself. One warm and quite clear night, we heard

the roar of planes, and a number of officers
scrambled up onto the castle turret, and I
followed. There was Major Lefty White in his
pajama bottoms and tin hat standing with other
officers watching the German bomber raid on
Portsmouth which lasted for about a half hour.
The searchlights were trying to sight on the
bombers while the ack-ack anti-aircraft guns
blazed away. We think we saw one bomber
knocked down. Although we were six to eight
miles away across the water, we could see the
flashes of bombs as they went off on impact.
On 12 June 1942, on the first full operational
rehearsal named “Yukon I,” we were landed by
the Navy on the Dorset coast in the morning
darkness a mile off course. We were half way up
the beach when someone onshore hollered, stop,
you’re in the middle of a minefield. We answered
we might as well walk through it as back out. So
we walked through it, and were lucky enough to
miss them all. On the second full rehearsal
named “Yukon II,” which occurred on 24 June,
the Navy managed to land us close to our
disembarkation point.
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Canadian troops embarking in a landing craft while training for the Dieppe operation.

Briefings for Operation “Rutter”

I

n the evenings after training, toward the end
of June, the officers of our regiment and other
regiments of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division
attended briefings on the proposed operation at
a Maritime Headquarters, which we reached by
crossing the inlet on the cable ferry between East
Cowes and Cowes. There was a complete model
of the landing sites and our regimental objectives
were outlined, but at first no names to the towns
were given. We were told by briefing officers
surprise was to be the element that would ensure
success. We were to speed or run and be on our
objectives before the Germans could rouse or
awake themselves, and man their defensive
positions. Lieutenant Len Dickin and myself,
both young junior officers, questioned how we
were going to achieve surprise when we knew
how we prepared for a German attack. After all,
every time the moon and tide were suitable for a
German crossing and landing, we increased our
alert. We got no answer to our question. A naval
officer told us to be quiet and not to repeat the
question.
We were informed that tanks, which could
provide supporting firepower, were to be landed
on the main beach at Dieppe. We argued for some

tanks on our beach objective, but we were told
the beach rocks or shingle at Pourville would
not support a tank. As it turned out, the shingle
at Dieppe was not ideal for the tanks either as
some of them became bogged down. But the main
point is that our objections were overruled by
the briefing officers.
We had practiced scaling walls by hoisting
one man on top of the other, but this was rather
slow and impractical so in later briefings we
argued for scaling ladders to climb the beach
walls. It took some discussion, but scaling
ladders of light steel were made and available
for “Jubilee” in August, although I do not
remember any being ready for “Rutter” in July.
We were also briefed that there was to be no
heavy bombing of the Dieppe landing areas
before disembarking because the Air Force could
not guarantee accuracy. Civilians might be killed
and rubble from bomb damage might block
access to our tanks. We were annoyed because
our battalion objectives required us to go up a
road and straight up a very steep hill which
would be rather like crossing a flat open sports
field in that there would be next to no cover from
enemy fire. Bombing would have created craters
and provided cover. You can then leap frog from
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one point of cover to the next. The weaknesses
in the plan, which the junior officers identified
from the very first briefings, later turned out to
be problems during the operation itself.

they were working properly. We also spent the
night going over the final briefing details with
our men because there had been a few small
changes to the plan since July. This is when the
men learned they were not going on an exercise,
but on Operation “Jubilee” to Dieppe, or Pourville
in our case to be more precise.

Operation “Rutter” Cancelled

O

n 7 July, we boarded the ships, and lay
offshore west of Cowes ready for the actual
operation codenamed “Rutter.” However, rough
weather and seas forced the cancellation of the
operation. While we had been waiting for the
signal to proceed, a German aircraft came over.
It dropped a couple of bombs, one of which hit a
ship in the area of the ship I was on. The bomb
went straight through two decks and out the side
before it exploded. So fortunately no one was
injured by the explosion. After cancellation of
the operation, we left the Isle of Wight, and stayed
temporarily at Wykehurst Park before moving
to Toat Hill tented Camp near Pulborough on
the mainland. There we resumed training.

Operation “Jubilee” Begins

W

e sailed just after dark in order to avoid
the daily German air reconnaissance. It was
a warm quiet still night with a bit of moon and a
bit of high cloud. In the early morning hours, as
we steamed south, the left or east flank of our
convoy bumped into a German convoy, and there
was a hell of a clatter of guns and tracer fire
going in all directions in the black of night. Our
reaction at the time was not that we would been
seen, but that something had been seen. Yet the
Germans did man and sleep in their defensive
positions at Puys, a Raid objective, nearest where
the convoy encounter took place.

O

ne day in August out of the blue, my
company commander Major John or “Mac”
MacTavish called a sudden meeting or “Orders
Group,” and told us we were going on an
embarkation exercise to practise for the second
front. We were to proceed directly to
Southampton carrying our G1098 stores, a
reserve of ammunition normally carried on
operations, but not exercises. This seemed odd,
so I asked MacTavish, is everything to be
operationally ready sir? He grinned yes. So I
guessed we were going on an operation to Dieppe.

Photo supplied by authors

Sudden Warning of an
Exercise on 18 August

We arrived at harbourside in Southampton,
and the ships were camouflaged this time. I
boarded the Princess Beatrix along with half of
our battalion; the other half boarded the Invicta.
On board we were issued with new Sten guns
and grenades right out of the shipping crates,
so they were full of grease and needed to be
cleaned. However, because we were on board
ship, we could not fire our weapons to ensure
A portrait of Lieutenant John S. Edmondson taken in
England in 1941 which he sent home to his wife Louise.
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Before long we were offshore. We climbed
down from the mother ship into our Landing
Craft Mechanized (LCMs) which carried about
110 men. In total, our battalion was carried by
two LCMs and ten small Landing Craft Assault
(LCAs) which each carried about 30 men. Then
we were launched toward shore in the dark
before dawn. It was about 0500 hours on 19
August when we touched down. We could just
make out the outline of the beach wall before
us. As we moved forward up the beach, the
landing craft withdrew to the convoy offshore to
wait under the protective cover of a smoke screen
laid down by ship and airplane.

A Description of Pourville
and our Objectives

B

efore continuing this story, I must describe
Pourville, and our objectives. Pourville is a
small village lying in a valley. There is a steep
headland on the west side of the valley and an
even steeper headland on the east side. The River
Scie runs north down the valley through the
village, and empties into the English Channel.
In 1942 there was a dam to hold back the river.

So the village was on a long east-west isthmus of
land with the sea in front and a man-made lake
behind – created by the Germans to deny
freedom of movement to invading forces along
this valley. There is one main street or road
running east-west through the village. The road
forks at the base of the east headland. One fork
or road goes up and over the east headland and
then descends into Dieppe, which is just under
one mile distant from Pourville. The other fork
or road runs south along the valley floor at the
base of the east headland.
Our battalion of 523 men was divided into
four companies of about 110 men, a battalion
headquarters commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Cecil Merritt, a special force of about 30 men
and a first aid post with stretcher bearers of
about 20 men.
As we landed, the west headland and
surrounding area on the right was the “C”
Company objective, Major Claude Orme, Officer
Commanding. The village in front was the “B”
Company objective, Major Lefty White, Officer
Commanding. The German Radio Direction
Finding (RDF) Station at the cliff edge and
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surrounding area on the east headland was the
“A” Company objective, Captain Murray Osten,
Officer Commanding. The Quatre Vents (Four
Winds) Farm with an artillery emplacement
further inland from the RDF Station on the east
headland was the “D” Company objective, Major
‘Mac’ MacTavish, Officer Commanding. The
Special force led by Lieutenant Les England was
to take out a German strongpoint located on the
slope about 25 yards above the base of the east
headland which commanded the main road
running east-west through the village. It should
be noted that an Air Force RDF technician and a
Field Security sergeant were attached to “A”
Company for the purpose of gathering
intelligence at the RDF station. Our regiment was
to secure these objectives so that the Queen’s
Own Cameron Highlanders (the Camerons), who
were to land after us, could proceed to objectives
further inland south along the valley.

The Landing and Operations at
Pourville (Green Beach)

Confusion reigned in the village. There were
Germans and French running about. The French
were shouting, “Don’t shoot.” And of course we
had orders not to shoot unless we could identify
a German, but it was still semi-dark. Rounding
the corner of a building, I came face to face with
a German and had my first experience of using
a Sten gun. I pulled the trigger – a dull thud –
misfire. He must have been more surprised and
nervous than I was because he did not shoot. I
ducked back around the corner and tried my
Sten gun again, thud again. So I threw it away
and picked up a rifle that someone had dropped
on the ground in the confusion. I fired it to ensure
it was in working order, and went back around
the corner, but the German was gone. Two years
later in Normandy, I always insisted on new
weapons being cleaned and fired to ensure they
were in working order because your life
depended on it.

NAC PA 501232

Although still a lieutenant, I was placed as
second in command of “D” Company which
meant I brought up the rear of our company
along with a wireless operator and two runners,
one of whom was Private Stan Fisher. My job
was to maintain communication between my
company commander Major MacTavish and our
battalion headquarters so that Col. Merritt could
redirect or alter instructions as needed.

men that there was a gap between the wall and
the tracer bullets which were on a fixed line of
fire – about 18 inches above the wall. Just keep
low, I said, and slide over the wall and then dash
for the cover behind the buildings. So over the
wall I went and others followed.

L

et me pick up the story again at the point
where we touched down. The ramp of the
LCM went down and we raced up the beach to
the sea wall. However, we realized at the same
time, that in the semidarkness, we had been
landed on the wrong side or west of the River
Scie. A German machine gun opened up and
tracer bullets whistled along the top of the beach
wall. The wall was covered in wire so I called for
a bangalore torpedo which was used to destroy
wire, but none was immediately at hand. So I
called for a wire cutter and out of the darkness
wire cutters were thrust into my hand. The
message was painfully obvious, if you want the
job done, do it yourself – officers lead. I climbed
the scaling ladder and cut the wire. I told the
Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Merritt, commander of the
South Saskatchewan Regiment, photographed in 1941.
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This photograph, taken in September 1944, shows the town of Pourville as viewed from the eastern headlands.

It was still somewhat dark, but I found my
wireless operator and runners. We went up to
the main street, and found it to be under
continuous machine gun fire from a pillbox or
concrete position at the base of the east
headland. We crouched alongside a building
about a150 yards or more west of the bridge over
the River Scie when I noticed a Bren gunner who
was shooting at the pillbox from behind an empty
gas pump or dispenser. It was one of those old
fashioned pumps with a glass cylinder on top,
and a hand pump at the side. I stepped behind
one of the gas pumps and suggested that I spot
for him, gave him the range, and said, let’s try it
in bursts. I watched his strike of shot through
my binoculars. With adjustment he was soon
peppering around the machine gun slot.
That German machine gunner caught sight
of us though, because bullets flew down both
sides of us. We could see the sparks as the bullets
hit the pavement.
Suddenly that particular pillbox ceased
firing. But whether knocked out by us or some
of the forward troops who stormed more than
one strong point, I could not tell. Around this
time a strange sound was carried on the sea
breeze from the beach. And since forward
movement along the main road near the bridge
over the River Scie was bogged down, I went
down to the sea wall to investigate. It was daylight
now, and the Cameron Highlanders were
approaching land. The strange sound was their

piper playing the bagpipes. As they touched
down, they were under German fire. I saw their
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred
Gostling, struck down as he stepped forward
from the landing craft.
When I returned to the main road, “B”
Company was still fighting house-to-house on
the west side of the bridge. There was German
sniper fire. Half of “D” Company and “A”
Company were now over the bridge. German
machine gun fire and mortar fire were
everywhere, but some was zeroed in right on the
bridge. Bodies of our wounded and dead already
lay along the 20 yards of bridge. With my crew, I
set about stringing up a rope toggle bridge under
the bridge as an alternate route at this
bottleneck. However, Col. Merritt came back and
said, it’s not fast enough, go across the top. But
not before there were a few words between us
about the usefulness of a toggle bridge.
Major Lefty White of “B” Company was at the
large central hotel on the north side of the road
before the bridge, so I asked him to lay down
some covering smoke on the bridge, which he
did. My little group of four dashed across the
bridge. The next thing I recalled was lying on
my back on the rocks down in the ditch on the
far side of the bridge. The concussion of a high
explosive blast had lifted me right through the
air. Two stretcher bearers were dressing a slight
scalp wound. I felt my face, and it was wet with
blood. I tried twice to get up, and fell each time.
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The air photo above shows Pourville as it appeared in August 1944. Little has changed from the time of the Dieppe Raid
two years earlier except that the light coloured lots in the photo indicate where houses and buildings were torn down after
the raid to deny cover should landings be attempted there again.

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2004

I had landed on the base of my spine,
and my legs were temporarily
paralyzed. Col. Merritt came over and
told the stretcher bearers to evacuate
me, but I said I’d be all right in a little
while.
From here I saw Col. Merritt walk
right into the face of the fire and urge
the remaining men across the bridge
more than once. He also picked up
and carried to safety my friend Les
England of the Special Force who was
seriously wounded attacking a
strongpoint which covered the road
exiting Pourville. Later I learned Les
was put aboard a landing craft that
was sunk. He was then picked up by
a destroyer that was bombed. He
crawled out the hole in the side of that
ship, and was picked up by a third
ship that delivered him back to
England.
53
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A German photo showing Green Beach
after the raid. A number of Canadian
casualties are visible.

Photo supplied by authors

the headland in the RDF station
area because their camouflage
netting heaved when they fired
their mortar or field gun. We
poured a concentrated blast of
anti-tank rifle, Bren gun and rifle
onto that position to suppress
their fire. We went downstairs
while German fire fell on the pub
in response. Then Edmundson,
Rogal and other “A” Company
men left, while I with “D”
Company men climbed back
upstairs in the pub to provide
covering fire as they moved
forward.

Sometime later, I hobbled to the first house
on the right of the road, which was a small inn
or pub. A small number of “A” and “D” Company
were already here including Captain Art
Edmundson, second-in-command of “A”
Company. He contacted Col. Merritt and his
company headquarters, and called for artillery
fire on the pillboxes on the eastern slopes, but
none was given. A few more joined us including
Private M. Rogal with his anti-tank rifle. The
Camerons were also starting to appear. We
spotted one particular German position high on

We stayed and provided
covering fire for some time.
However, during this period, it
was slow going because if anyone
wanted to move forward, the
next bit of cover was already
occupied by men. Moreover, any
movement seen by the Germans
brought down a rain of accurate
mortar and machine gun fire. My
wireless operator was also here,
but his set was gone. We found
another wireless set and
twiddled the dial, but it was
dead. Then we went down the
road ourselves.

I reorganized the men I came
upon, giving them the automatic
weapons from the walking
wounded who were sent back to
the beach. I gave some men the task of trying to
locate and eliminate snipers, and to others the
task of beating down enemy mortar fire, in other
words, the task of providing supporting fire for
the men who were trying to reach the high ground
objectives.
By this time, the focus of action had shifted
to the east of the village, and to the slopes directly
above, and to the right under the Four Winds
Farm. Major Claude Orme and “C” Company,
meanwhile, had successfully captured the west
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headland area. It became clear to Col. Merritt
that “D” Company, despite attacking some
positions, was unable to proceed further up the
slope toward the Four Winds Farm. The
interlocking line of German defences with wire,
machine gun nests, snipers, mortar and artillery
was too strong. So word was received to redeploy
“D” Company toward “A” Company’s objective,
the RDF station area. I sent runners forward to
Major MacTavish but never saw the runners
again. By now the Germans had brought their
artillery fully into action, and there was aircraft
activity overhead. The firepower directed at us
was increasing.
Meantime I bumped into Captain H.B.
Carswell, the Forward Observation Officer. I tried
to get him to call down naval gunfire from our
destroyer Albrighton, but he refused because I
could not pinpoint exactly where the forward line
was. We had quite a heated argument. I said it
could not matter less where the forward troops
are because I know they are not within the danger
area of the objective I want you to have shelled.
But to no avail, the forward troops were to have
no fire support.
Further attacks by “A” Company with Captain
Murray Osten and “D” Company were repulsed,
with the result being that they were not able to
get close enough to penetrate the RDF area or
position. Nor did RDF technician Jack
Nissenthall and his escort, field security Sergeant
Roy Hawkins. Their joint statements to
debriefing officers after the Raid documented
that because “A” Company could not proceed
further uphill against the heavy defences, the two
men attached themselves to the Camerons
instead, and proceeded south inland in hope of
finding an alternate route, but were unsuccessful.
I was preparing to send two sections of
reorganized men forward to reinforce the “A” and
“D” Company men on the slopes, when I met
some of the Camerons and Captain “Jack” or
John Runcie who were at the east end of the
village area. Captain Runcie still had his wireless
set, and I used it to contact Col. Merritt who
relayed the message “Vanquish 1030 Green
Peter” which was changed to 1100 Green Peter
shortly after. It meant that at 1100 hours we were
to re-embark at the same place we had landed. I
dispatched runners to tell Major MacTavish, and
anyone else they saw of the withdrawal order. I
also contacted Captain Edmundson of “A”

Company, who was on the slope, by radio, and
relayed the message to him. At the same time,
Col. Merritt had also ordered us, and the
Camerons with us, to hold the beachhead to
allow time for the landing craft to come in. So
we decided to go back to the pub and organize
our defensive action there.

Withdrawal and Rearguard Action

I

was with Captain Ron Wilkinson of “B”
Company by a wall near where the road forks
at the east end of the village when he said he
was going back. I said, wait a minute, I’ll join
you. Then I changed my mind. I said, watch the
corner of that building you’re headed toward
because the Germans seem to have a direct line
of fire on it. He had no sooner passed the corner
than fire came down hitting his hand. I believe
he lost one or more fingers. The men were
starting to withdraw toward the beach area now.
I made my way carefully back to the pub
where there were about 20 South Saskatchewan
men, and Captain Runcie with his group of
Camerons. Captain Runcie and the other
Camerons then left the pub to take up a defensive
position on the west side of the village. We who
remained divided into two sections of ten to cover
the east side of the village. One group under
Corporal E. Hart took up a position on the north
side of the road toward the bend at the base of
the east headland, while Corporal R. Jackson
and the others who remained with me took up
our position in the pub on the south side of the
road. We had a quantity of mortar, some antitank rifles, Bren guns with magazines and rifles
of course.
So we began our rearguard action to provide
cover for the troops withdrawing to the beach,
and to hold back the German advance. We gave
a blast on the German positions on the slopes,
and at the Germans we could see moving north
on bicycles along the road at the base of the east
headland toward us in the village. We managed
to knock a few off their bicycles, forcing the
others to ground and slowing their advance.
The Germans replied with machine gun fire
and mortar fire that fell directly on top of the
pub. But we had run downstairs after firing.
When there was a lull in their fire on the pub,
we ran upstairs and fired bursts at them again
55
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which brought down more German
bombardment, but we had sprinted downstairs
again. The upper floor of the inn was steadily
disintegrating. We continued this action for some
time. It seemed a good 20 minutes since we had
seen the last of our troops withdraw over the
beach wall. I asked a runner to go back to
Battalion Headquarters to see what the situation
was there and at the beach, but he did not return.
I sent a second runner, and he did not come back
either. I asked for another runner, but nobody
wanted to cross that bridge twice because there
was still German machine gun and mortar fire
everywhere.
I went back myself and could not find the
Battalion Headquarters group or anyone at all.
So I went down to the beach wall. There was
nothing but desolation there. German aircraft
were strafing, and high and low level bombing
the ships and beach area. Artillery was falling.
One landing craft was sunk or disabled in the
water. A group of men with some German
prisoners were huddled in the water behind the
craft. But fire was coming from both headlands
now because the Germans had reoccupied the
west headland after our withdrawal. This group
put their hands up to indicate they were
unarmed, and attempted to get to the shelter of
the sea wall, but were mowed down, the German

prisoners along with our own troops. There were
men lying where they were hit when they tried to
leave the shelter of the sea wall, or in the water
where they had tried to get into the landing craft
that had come back in waves to pick men up.
The Germans were trying to destroy us
completely. What was worse, the last landing
craft was just pulling off. The chap on board
waved and shouted, sorry fellows, we’ve been
ordered not to come in again.
Let me digress here to tell about a staff
dinner I attended later, in December 1943. After
the dinner, Brigadier Churchill Mann spoke
about communications and how messages are
sometimes relayed incorrectly. He told a story
from the Dieppe Raid of a message which was
sent out to landing craft at the time of
withdrawal. It read, “If no further evacuation
possible, withdraw.” But when relayed the “If”
was omitted and the message was received as,
“No further evacuation possible, withdraw.” I
spoke up and told about the skipper who
shouted they’d been ordered not to come in
again. I added it was anything but amusing or
humorous to those who were on the beach.
I made my way back to the pub where I told
the group of about eight men who were left to go
back to the beach one at a time, and to see if

NAC PA 192015

Three Canadian soldiers discuss the action of 1942 while sitting on the seawall at Pourville, 4 September 1944. From left
to right: Sergeant-Major Basil Smith, Major F.W. Hayter, RCAMC and Private Allan Taylor, RCCS.
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Soldiers of the South Saskatchewan Regiment revisit the beach at
Pourville where they fought two years earlier, 4 September 1944.

they could find a way out. We could see the
Germans cautiously making their way along the
road. We fired our last round of mortar at them,
and then the last two of us pulled out and went
back to the beach.

Just fortunate to get off the beach

T

here were about 25 of us here, just
west of the centre of the beach wall. An ammo
count showed us we had only one magazine of
Bren left, one or two rounds of mortar and some
rifle. Not much and the Germans were only 300
yards away. Lieutenant Ven Conn from our
Company came along; he had a big dressing on
the side of his face. He joined us, but was
captured later. I actually thought at this time that
we’d been left behind. I did not know that there
were about 200 South Saskatchewans and
Camerons against the sea wall at the western
side of the village because we could not see them
along the wall because obstructions protruded
at various points. Then out of the smoke from
the east side, an enterprising naval chap in a
small landing craft started a sweep parallel to
the shore about 400 yards out. We waved, and
received a wave of acknowledgment from the
landing craft. It drew enemy fire, but
miraculously no heavy fire hit it.
“Well fellows,” I said, “if you want to go home,
there it is. But once you leave the sea wall, if you

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004

get shot, no one stops to pick you up because
anyone who stops will be shot dead. Is that
understood?” “Yes, sir,” they replied. I said, “Let’s
go then.” Not a man moved. I told them that
landing craft is your last chance. I’m going now,
let’s go, and I went. It’s hard to be sure but about
15 to 20 men ran to the water and waded out
into the shallow water of low tide. A few men
were left standing by the wall in doubt. It seemed
a hell of a long way to go, almost endless, when
I was being shot at. But the concentrated enemy
machine gun, mortar and artillery fire claimed
many of us. Not more than five or six of us got
aboard.
The landing craft turned and headed straight
out, bullets ricocheting off the metal sides. Even
though we were told to keep our heads down
under the metal bulwarks, the smell of the boat
made me feel queasy, so uncaring, I stuck my
head up for fresh air rather than be sick. The
skipper said he did not think this boat could
make it all the way back to England so he
transferred the wounded to a larger vessel, and
those of us who were mobile to a large tank
landing craft farther out, where we scrambled
aboard up the netting. I do not remember much
about that afternoon except that the anti-aircraft
guns were going. After the Raid, it was reported
that we lost close to 100 aircraft while the
Germans reported losses of about 50. Whatever
the numbers reported at the time, the losses were
significant for both sides. There were craft and
57
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Officers from the South Saskatchewan Regiment talk with a war correspondent soon after the Dieppe Raid at Toat Hill
Camp near Pulborough. All four officers successfully returned from Pourville. From left to right: the author, Lieutenant
John S. Edmondson, “D” Company; Major James E. McRae, Battalion HQ; war correspondent [thought to be Gerry
Wilmot]; Lieutenant L. Ross McIlveen, “C” Company; Lieutenant G.B. ‘Buck’ Buchanan, Battalion HQ.

ships continuously going back and forth. It was
dark before we landed at Newhaven.

Reception at Newhaven
and Return to Camp

A

Provost or military policeman met and
directed us into a vehicle which took us to a
reception centre. We went in through a blackout
curtain into a building. The reception team
grabbed us and questioned us. What happened?
Who came back with you? Who did you see killed
or wounded? I gave them the list of the men on
the truck, and said briefly what I did. But as to
killed and wounded, I said I saw a lot, but can’t
remember explicitly anything. Remember, the
nine hours ashore seemed like only ten minutes.
And in the heat of the moment for the most part,
you only register someone is hit and do not stop
to register, oh, that is John Smith. As well, it
was more than 30 hours since our last meal at
lunch the day before. Heavens, even I was
reported killed by someone who had probably
seen me knocked off the road at the end of the
bridge, so you can’t be sure of anything. They

handed me a mug of rum, but the thought
nauseated me so I asked for tea and something
to eat. That steaming tea and bully beef on white
bread sandwich tasted better than anything I’d
ever eaten.
Since nothing else was happening now, and
no one could tell me what to do or expect, I
rounded up the South Saskatchewan men I could
find with the object of returning to camp. Our
group of 29 men found a driver outside who took
us back to Toat Hill Camp. It was just after
midnight when we arrived back, and we found
that we were the first group back. After arousing
the camp, we had something to eat, and then off
to bed.

The News at Home in Canada

N

ext day, 20 August, a CBC radio reporter
named Gerry Wilmot came to our camp and
interviewed us. As one of the few officers who
had returned from seeing the forward positions,
I was interviewed and was asked to introduce
several of the men including Company Sergeant

58
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol13/iss4/5

12

Edmondson and Edmondson: Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942

Major Frank Mathers, Private Stan Fisher and
Lance Corporal Rutz. (Col. Merritt, Majors
MacTavish, White and Orme, Captains Osten and
Edmundson and Lieutenant Conn had become
POWs.) Our interviews were broadcast more than
once across Canada. My wife Louise had become
very worried as news of the operation had
broken. She went downtown in Calgary where
we lived and sent me a telegraph which read:
“Worried. Haven’t heard from you in six weeks.
Please write.” No sooner had she returned to our
apartment on 12th Avenue East than she heard
the broadcast of the interviews on the radio, and
she cried in relief. That’s how she learned I had
survived. Neighbours came by and friends
phoned to tell her they had heard the news as
well.

Red Cross obtained a full list of prisoners of war,
which numbered 89. And this meant the
remaining 82 were either killed or missing in
action. Slowly over the next few months
replacements were drawn from the holding
centre or from overseas. Training for the second
front resumed.

The Aftermath

In the aftermath, we were told by Battalion
Headquarters to have every man write or tell
about what he saw or did, and these observations
were then typed up. On the basis of these reports,
Battalion Headquarters would recommend those
they thought were deserving of medals. Seeing
the potential for self-promotion, my reaction was
swift. That’s no damn way to get medals in this

G

roups of people continued to come back into
camp on 20 August, until there were about
210 of the 523 in camp. It soon dawned on us
that a lot were not coming back. There were 143
reported wounded in hospital. And that left 171
men. It was more than two months before the

In respect to my company, “D” Company,
Major MacTavish, the Officer Commanding, was
captured. Of the three Platoon Commanders,
Lieutenant Ven Conn was wounded and
captured, Lieutenant Jack Nesbitt was wounded
and returned to England, but I cannot recall who
was acting as the third platoon commander.
Because our company was short an officer before
the raid, one of several sergeants in the company
would have filled this role.

NAC PA 136017

Men of the South Saskatchewan Regiment who crossed the bridge with
Lieutenant-Colonel Merritt pose for a photo on the bridge, 4 September 1944.
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The authors, John Edmondson (right) and his son Doug,
stand beside Merritt’s Bridge in Pourville during a recent
visit in July 2004.

Photo by Randy Wakelam

spelling of names. Now 61 years later, after
reviewing the report and two statements I gave
in 1942 for the first time, I decided to revise my
account to include a few aspects I had forgotten.

damn army, I said. I’ll recommend anyone I saw
do anything worthwhile, and I will get my men
to tell their stories. But do not expect me to
provide one. Instead, I gave a brief report on our
“D” Company action.
However, because I was one of the few officers
who had seen the forward positions on the east
side of Pourville, and who had returned, I came
under pressure to corroborate the testimony
others had given about the actions of a certain
individual. I refused to verify anything I had not
seen myself, but did give a second statement
concerning what I had done and seen east of the
bridge. I commended the actions of Captain
Arthur Edmundson (who is not related to me
despite similarity of name) on account of his
calm, initiative, and well organized tactics under
fire. And I gave a third statement as to what I
had seen Colonel Merritt do.
So not until 51 years later did I write my
first personal account, which was produced
almost entirely from memory except for verifying
details like dates, numbers of casualties and the

In respect to awards, I came to look upon
medals with a jaundiced eye because some men
we recommended for great deeds of courage or
sacrifice in unsuccessful operations never
received one, here and in Normandy, while some
men received them in successful operations for
good deeds that were not as outstanding. Such
was the political climate within the Army in
regard to medals.
A short time later, we were given a general
medal which if I recall correctly was called the
1939-42 Star, and it was later renamed the 193945 Star so that in the end there was no specific
medal for service in the Dieppe Raid – that was
still true in 1993 when this story was first
written. On 2 January 1994, the CBC presented
a television program which dramatized the
Dieppe Raid, and underlined the lack of
recognition for the men who had served there. It
provoked public pressure which led in the spring
of 1994 to the announcement of the issuance of
a Dieppe Clasp which conveyed recognition at
last, after so many years.
In the Raid post-evaluation period, it was
found that some small Canadian towns, and even
individual families, had sustained multiple
losses or wounds of community or family
members. In our regiment there were two
brothers killed, Melville and Walter Beatty, aged
23 and 22 years respectively. As a result it was
decided that not all family members should be
permitted to serve in the same unit in order to
reduce the risk of multiple loss. My brothers Bill
and Dick Edmondson served with the South
Saskatchewan Regiment as well. However, my
brother Dick suffered a leg and back injury
during training, so under this new Army policy,
he was transferred in early 1943 to Canada
where he served at the Officer Training School
in Brockville, Ontario until the end of the war in
1945.
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Another repercussion of the Dieppe Raid was
the new policy that older men over age 40 were
not deemed suitable for combat roles. As a result,
many men throughout the army were transferred
to administrative or training functions because
of their age, and our battalion was no exception.
If my memory is correct, Lieutenant-Colonel H.T.
Kempton, Major Jim McRae and Captain Percy
Jardine fell into this category.

Reflections

I

n retrospect, I was a young inexperienced
headstrong officer – only 23 years old at the
time. And I was angry about aspects of the
operation. About how we were expected to gain
surprise and run onto the headland enemy
positions before they could rouse themselves –
an impossible task. About the lack of prebombing and cover. About how we were landed
on the wrong side of the River Scie, the
consequence being that we had to run the
gauntlet on the bridge over the River Scie. About
how we had to go over the bridge rather than
under it on a rope. About how we had no naval,
tank or artillery fire support so that we had
insufficient firepower to do the tasks expected
of us. One frustration was mounted on another
while we came under German sniper, machine
gun, mortar, artillery, high and low level bombing
and strafing fire from a well organized defence.
It all culminated in nine hours of horror for us.
But that’s not to say Dieppe was fruitless. It
is known in military circles that after this,
because of the mistakes made, the D-Day assault
of 1944 was planned across open beaches rather
than on heavily-defended ports. Moreover, there
was to be full air, naval, tank and artillery
support from the outset. In addition, a
permanent landing fleet was maintained and
procedures were refined so that landings
elsewhere during the war were successful. Still
we paid a heavy price for this “learning
experience” which some argue should have been
known already: for example, from the experience
of the Dardanelles landings in Turkey during the
First World War.
In the opinion of some, Dieppe was a
“strategic success” because it kept the threat of
an Allied invasion and a western front more
centred in the German mind. Thus German

troops were committed to western defence, a fact
which helped reduce the pressure on our
Russian allies on the eastern front. Yet to me, a
strategic success remains a cold comfort when
measured against the suffering of the men at
Dieppe, and the suffering of their families.

Pourville and Dieppe
Revisited – 1992

I

n August of 1992, I went back with my wife
Louise and my two sons for the 50th
Anniversary of the Dieppe Raid. We visited the
war cemetery there. I still felt the sorrow at the
loss of so many friends as I read their names on
the gravestones – some of them schoolmates and
family friends, others friends made while serving
in the army. My wife Louise was upset because
she could not find the headstone for her high
school classmate Private Walter Chymko from
Semans, Saskatchewan. At the time, we thought
his body may be one of the more than a hundred
graves marked unknown, or may be one of those
whose bodies were never recovered. Later, after
our visit, we learned Private Chymko was buried
in the Canadian Cemetery near Calais. So his
body must have been carried down the coast by
the ocean currents.
Nevertheless, I was heartened to see that so
many French people attended the prayer vigil on
the night of the 18th of August at the cemetery.
In the parade of the 300 veterans next day from
the cenotaph to the Dieppe City Hall, the Dieppe
citizens lined the streets 12 deep. Here at least
the efforts of the living, wounded and dead in
the face of adversity are still cherished and kept
alive. At home in Canada, at the time of the first
writing of this story, few seemed to teach the
younger people about our achievements which
are known to few, and we seemed largely
forgotten.
Since the 50th Anniversary of the D-Day
landings in 1994, greater interest and honour
has been expressed by Canadian citizens toward
the veterans each year, as our ranks thin. More
effort has been made to learn about our
experiences. And more gratitude has been shown
for our contribution toward creating the positive
conditions, including freedom, which we enjoy
today.
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